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ARGUMENT 
Appellee, just as it did when opposing Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
at the district court level, completely ignored the overwhelming evidence that the 
Annexation Agreement had been interpreted and applied in the exact manner in which 
Appellants request in this Appeal Instead, Appellee relies solely on its own self-serving 
statement that a document (which contains absolutely no confirming indicia) is what 
Appellee wants it to be. Furthermore, Appellee claims that, because that document is 
what Appellee claims it is, Appellee was free to completely ignore all past applications of 
a land agreement and create substantively different rights for neighboring landowners 
under that agreement. Such action was arbitrary and, therefore, the trial court erred when 
it granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Appellants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. This Court should reverse the trial court's decision. 
I. NO EVIDENCE SUPPORTS APPELLEE'S CLAIM THAT PAGE 9 OF THE 
MUNICIPAL RECORD IS THE PROPOSED PRELIMINARY 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN. 
Appellee's claim that Page 9 of the Municipal Record (R. at 246)1 is the 
Preliminary Development Plan is not supported by any documentary evidence 
whatsoever. Appellee supports its claim by stating, in essence, that (1) the Annexation 
Agreement refers to a Preliminary Development Plan, (2) Page 9 of the Municipal Record 
was recorded with the Annexation Agreement, and (3) therefore, Page 9 is the 
Preliminary Development Plan. Appellee makes this claim despite the fact that nothing 
1
 In Appellants' Brief, this Page 9 was cited as p. 246 of the Appellate Record. This same 
Page 9 was cited as p. 246 of the Appellate Record in Appellee's Brief. For ease of 
reference, this page is the eighth (8th) page of Addendum A to the Brief of Appellants. 
1 
on Page 9 of the Municipal Record provides any indication that it is the Preliminary 
Development Plan and language on Page 9 affirmatively indicates that it is something 
else entirely. 
Page 9 of the Municipal Record is entitled "Preliminary Plat of Willow Canyon 
Subdivision," and nowhere does it contain the words "Development" or "Plan." It was 
recorded as the first page immediately after the Annexation Agreement, despite the fact 
that the Preliminary Development Plan was referred to as Exhibit B or Attachment B 
throughout the Annexation Agreement. Page 9 of the Municipal Record is not labeled as 
Exhibit B, and it does not include any language that connects it to any part of the 
Annexation Agreement. 
Furthermore, the property at issue is not located within the Willow Canyon 
Subdivision, but rather, is part of the Willow Canyon project. Appellee ignores this fact 
and simply argues that, because it was recorded as part of the Annexation Agreement, it 
is what Appellee says it is (rather than what the document actually says it is). Thus, 
according to Appellee, even though Appellants own no property within the Willow 
Canyon Subdivision, it should be bound by a document that, in its title, clearly indicates 
that it applies to a subdivision in which Appellants5 property is not included. 
Appellee relies solely on the fact that a document was recorded as part of the 
Annexation Agreement as evidence that that document is the Preliminary Development 
Plan. No other evidence exists to support such an assertion. All of Appellee's evidence 
regarding the nature of Page 9 of the Municipal Record comes solely from self-serving 
assertions regarding Page 9 and not from Page 9 itself. The law does not allow Appellee 
2 
to change the nature of a recorded document simply through subsequent rationalization of 
what Appellee wants that document to be. 
No actual, recorded evidence supports Appellee's contention that Page 9 of the 
Municipal Record is the Preliminary Development Plan which Appellee claims it relied 
upon in limiting Appellants' permissible disturbance area to 60,000 square feet. This, 
especially when combined with the facts regarding Appellee's past interpretation and 
application of the Annexation Agreement (discussed infra), demonstrates that Appellee's 
decision was arbitrary and that the trial court erred when it granted Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
II. ALL OF THE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING RECORDED DOCUMENTS, 
CITY ORDINANCES, AND APPELLEE'S OWN PRIOR APPLICATION 
OF THE ANNEXATION AGREEMENT, SUPPORTS APPROVAL OF THE 
PROPOSED LAND DISTURBANCE INCLUDED WITHIN APPELLANTS5 
ORIGINAL SITE PLAN APPLICATION. 
In their original Site Plan Application, Appellants requested authorization to 
disturb approximately 90,000 square feet of their property's natural landscape. (R. at 209-
212.) This amount of disturbance would cover approximately 14% of the Appellants' 
15.06 acre property. Such a request is permissible according to the language of the 
Annexation Agreement. Furthermore, such a request is also permissible under Appellee's 
own official, on-the-record interpretation of the Annexation Agreement. However, 
despite the clear language of the Annexation Agreement and Appellee's specifically-
stated policy (created just two years earlier), Appellee denied Appellants' Site Plan 
Application and arbitrarily limited Appellants' use of their own property. 
3 
A. Neither the Annexation Agreement nor city ordinances limit lot sizes in the 
Willow Canyon project. 
The Annexation Agreement itself makes no mention of lot sizes. The Annexation 
Agreement addresses what maximum number of lots is permitted, where the lots should 
be located, and how the lots should be used. Nowhere within the Annexation Agreement 
is lot size defined or established. Furthermore, no current Alpine City Ordinance 
establishes or requires a maximum lot size. 
Despite this, Appellee extrapolates a maximum lot size from Page 9 of the 
Municipal Record. However, nothing within the Annexation Agreement states that Page 
9—the Preliminary Plat of Willow Canyon Subdivision—establishes a maximum lot size. 
Rather, Appellee states that, because the Preliminary Plat of Willow Canyon Subdivision 
includes a tiny notation within each of the five lots included within the Willow Canyon 
project that states "40,000 sq. ft.," that notation established maximum lot size. However, 
this explanation is simply a rationalization. Appellee has already stated that, when 
Appellee changed its ordinances and began allowing maximum lot sizes within its 
boundaries of 60,000 square feet, Appellee applied that same expansion to the Willow 
Canyon project properties. (R. at 190.) 
As Appellants noted at the trial court level and in their opening brief, Appellee 
again changed its ordinances (prior to Appellants' Site Plan Application) and Appellee's 
ordinances currently have no upper, maximum limit on lot sizes. (R. at 190.) However, 
Appellee now refuses to apply this ordinance, which it already conceded changes the 
maximum lot size allowable for lots within the Willow Canyon project, to Appellants' 
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property. In other words, Appellee conceded that the "40,000 sq. ft." notation within the 
Preliminary Plat of Willow Canyon Subdivision document expanded to 60,000 square 
feet when Appellee changed its city-wide lot-size ordinance, but now, Appellee contends 
that the "40,000 sq. ft." notation is a requirement of the Annexation Agreement that has 
never changed. This explanation, on its face, has no merit. The "40,000 sq. ft." notation 
was meant to be a reflection of the ordinances in place when the Annexation Agreement 
was signed rather than an unchangeable limitation on lot sizes in the Willow Canyon 
project. Since no other provision within the Annexation Agreement purports to limit lot 
size, Appellee cannot point to any evidence within the Annexation Agreement that 
supports Appellee's decision to deny Appellants' Site Plan Application due to the 
proposed area of land disturbance. 
B. Prior to Appellant's Site Plan Application, Appellee had always interpreted 
and applied the Annexation Agreement in the exact manner that Appellant 
requested. 
Appellee chose not to respond to Appellants' overwhelming evidence that 
Appellee applied the Annexation Agreement in exactly the way Appellants requested 
when Appellee considered previous applications submitted by other property owners 
within the Willow Canyon project. Appellee has only ever given two explanations for the 
past interpretation of the Annexation Agreement: Appellee either made a mistake or 
approved a larger lot as an exception to the Annexation Agreement's requirements. (R. at 
157,292.) 
A quick review of Appellee's on-the-record interpretation of the Annexation 
Agreement fully demonstrates that such explanations have no merit whatsoever. At the 
5 
time that Appellee considered the Van Leeuwen application (which was approximately 
three years prior to Appellants' Site Plan Application and, in terms of Willow Canyon 
project applications, the application immediately prior to Appellants' Application), 
Appellee clearly did not consider the 60,000 square foot disturbance allowance to be an 
exception to the Annexation Agreement. In fact, Appellee quoted directly from the 
Annexation Agreement as justification for approving the Van Leewen's application to 
disturb 60,000 square feet. (R. at 106; see Brief of Appellants at p. 7 for Appellee's exact 
approval language). Appellee never once used the word "exception" in its deliberations 
or final decisions regarding the previous Willow Canyon project applications. 
Furthermore, Appellee's pattern of approvals for all of the previous Willow 
Canyon project applicants demonstrates that their interpretations of the Annexation 
Agreement were not mistakes. Appellee always followed the Annexation Agreement's 
language as affected by the current city ordinances. There was no misreading of a very 
clear, unambiguous document. Appellee simply refused to follow its prior precedent 
when it considered Appellants' Site Plan Application and, instead, arbitrarily created a 
separate interpretation of the Annexation Agreement to support its denial of Appellants' 
proposed disturbance area. 
III. APPELLANTS DID NOT HAVE NOTICE THAT THEY WERE UNABLE 
TO DISTURB MORE THAN 60,000 SQUARE FEET OF THE NATURAL 
LANDSCAPE ON THEIR PROPERTY. 
Appellee's contention that Appellants had constructive notice that their property 
was limited to a certain amount of square feet of disturbance based upon the Annexation 
Agreement and the Preliminary Plat of Willow Canyon Subdivision is not correct. 
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Appellants have noted numerous reasons why Appellee's (and the trial court's) position 
regarding constructive notice is incorrect in their original brief (see Brief of Appellants at 
pp. 35-39.) However, Appellees argue that, simply because the Annexation Agreement 
refers to an annexation policy and an attachment B, such references are sufficient to put 
Appellants on notice that Appellee would apply a completely different set of rules, 
unsupported by the Annexation Agreement itself, to their Site Plan Application. Such an 
argument is incorrect.2 
As noted in Appellants' opening brief, had Appellants investigated Alpine City's 
annexation policy, Appellants would have found out that Alpine City approved the Van 
Leeuwen disturbance request because that request contemplated disturbing 14% of the 
total natural landscape of the property owned by the Van Leeuwens. Appellants also 
would have found out that Alpine City considered the 10 acre Van Leeuwen property to 
be one single lot. Appellants also would have found out that Appellee had expanded the 
purported 40,000 square foot lot limitation to 60,000 square feet when Appellee amended 
its ordinances to allow for larger-sized lots within its boundaries. Appellants also would 
have found out that the current ordinances (in place for several years) had changed again 
and that they no longer placed a maximum limitation upon lot sizes within Appellee's 
boundaries. 
2
 Also, Appellee claims that the case Meyer v. General American Corp., 569 P.2d 1094, 
is inapplicable to this case because it discusses personal property and security interests 
rather than constructive notice regarding real property. Although the facts in Meyer 
address issues regarding personal property, Utah's constructive notice standard does not 
change. The standard in both contexts is identical: did circumstances arise that should put 
a reasonable person on guard so as to require further inquiry on his or her part? 
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Based upon all of the above facts that were in existence at the time Appellants 
purchased their property, the proposed disturbance area within Appellants' Site Plan 
Application should have been approved. The above facts are undisputed (and have been 
completely ignored) by Appellee. It was only after Appellants purchased the property that 
Appellee modified the requirements of the Annexation Agreement. Appellee ignores the 
status of its municipal law when Appellants purchased their property and instead argues 
that, when Appellants purchased the property, they should have been able to expect that, 
despite all of the above facts, Appellee would strictly apply a strict 40,000 square foot lot 
size requirement that it had never previously applied, despite three previous opportunities 
to do so. Such an argument does not comport with Utah's constructive notice law. 
Appellants did not have constructive notice of the restrictions that Appellee placed 
on their property. In fact, based upon the evidence above, Appellants can claim that they 
had constructive notice that they could treat their entire property as one lot, that they 
could disturb up to 50% of the natural landscape of that lot, and that their request to 
disturb 14% of that lot was well within the Annexation Agreement's allowable 
parameters. Appellee's argument that Appellants (or anyone else, for that matter) had any 
type of notice of Appellee's drastic reversal of its previously existing municipal law has 
no merit. 
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IV. DESPITE APPELLEE'S CLAIM TO THE CONTRARY, APPELLANTS 
DID NOT RECEIVE THE SAME RIGHTS AND BENEFITS GRANTED 
TO OTHER LANDOWNERS IN A SIMILAR SITUATION. 
Appellee claims that its decision was not arbitrary or capricious "because it 
resulted in the Landowner having the same rights and benefits granted to the other land 
owners in a similar situation." (Brief of Appellee at pp. 18-19.) This claim is incorrect. 
Appellee approved a natural landscape disturbance not to exceed 60,000 square 
feet. (R. at 292). This approval allowed Appellant to disturb approximately 9% of its 
property, which is approximately 15.06 total acres in size. Appellee previously allowed 
the Van Leeuwens, owners of another property within the Willow Canyon project, to 
disturb approximately 14% of their property, which is approximately 10 acres in size. 
Appellee cannot equate the 60,000 square feet of disturbance area that it allowed in each 
application as granting equal rights because the properties are not the same size. Use of 
60,000 square feet within a 10 acre lot of land is not the same as use of 60,000 square feet 
within a 15 acre lot. In fact, the difference is stark, as the owner of the 10 acre lot would 
be allowed to use 50% more of his or her land than the owner of the 15 acre lot. 
Appellee's attempt to minimize its arbitrary decision by stating that it treated 
property owners in the same manner is just another in a long line of post hoc 
rationalizations in an attempt to justify an unsupportable decision. Appellee's 
justification that it treated the property owners equally also completely disregards the 
City Council's and Planning Commission's role as an administrative/adjudicative body. 
Appellee attempts to justify vesting the City Council and Planning Commission with a 
9 
quasi-legislative decision-making power that it does not have. {See Brief of Appellant at 
pp. 17-18,24.) 
Appellee's argument basically sanctions setting aside Appellee's own ordinances 
regarding the City Council's and Planning Commission's limited powers to approve or 
deny land use applications based upon their conformance with existing ordinances. 
Instead, Appellee argues that the City Council is empowered to extralegally endow upon 
itself an ability to decide what is equitable, despite what contracts or ordinances may say. 
Such a decision is arbitrary in and of itself, and Appellants have demonstrated that 
Appellee did not have any basis in an ordinance or in the Annexation Agreement itself to 
decide that 60,000 square feet was the maximum allowable disturbance area for any 
property owned within the Willow Canyon project area. {See Brief of Appellant at pp. 21-
26 (subsection II.C.).) Appellee is not empowered to exercise "equity" through its 
Planning Commission and City Council bodies. Such use of authority is arbitrary in and 
of itself, as neither body is empowered to simply decide to restrict a second landowner's 
use of property based upon purported mistakes and/or exceptions made when considering 
a first landowner's use of similar property. 
Appellee did not treat Appellants in the same manner as previous landowners 
within the Willow Canyon project. Furthermore, Appellee's contention that its City 
Council and Planning Commission bodies are empowered to disregard written contracts 
and city ordinances in an attempt to be fair demonstrates the arbitrariness of Appellee's 
decision in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred when it granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denied Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellee has no written, 
documentary evidence to support its claim that Page 9 of the Municipal Record is the 
Proposed Development Plan. Furthermore, all of the documentary evidence, as well as 
Appellee's own past conduct, support Appellants' interpretation of the Annexation 
Agreement. Appellants never had notice that they were unable to disturb more than 
60,000 square feet of the natural landscape of their property, for such a standard had 
never been created by contract or ordinance. Appellee's claim that Appellants received 
the same rights as other landowners within the Willow Canyon project is also incorrect, 
and Appellee's attempt to bypass written contracts and binding city ordinances was 
arbitrary in and of itself. Because Appellee's decision to deny Appellants' request to 
disturb 90,000 square feet of natural landscape was arbitrary, the trial court erred when it 
granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Annexation Agreement is 
unambiguous and, in the past, Appellee already interpreted the Annexation Agreement in 
the exact way that Appellants request. Therefore, this Court should also reverse the trial 
court's decision denying summary judgment to Appellants. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of January 2010. 
HIM^JDi^TOM & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
lesenberry 
Aaron R. Harris 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants 
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